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  The shareholder’s role in corporate management is evolving. In 
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, the Delaware Supreme Court likely expanded 
that role in a ruling that signals the potential for greater shareholder 
access to the corporate boardroom and enhanced director 
accountability. The court determined that a shareholder proposal to 
mandate reimbursement of certain board of director candidates was a 
proper subject for shareholder bylaws. But the court also held that the 
particular bylaw in question did not preserve the board’s ability to 
exercise its fiduciary duties and, therefore, violated Delaware law. 
Future bylaws governing director nominations and elections are likely 
to include fiduciary-out clauses to preserve directors’ fiduciary duties. 
Boards of directors can use those fiduciary outs to refuse 
reimbursement to successful candidates, discouraging future 
shareholder nominees.  
  This Note urges Delaware courts to review the exercise of such 
fiduciary-out clauses under the strict standard of scrutiny articulated 
in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. The Blasius standard 
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requires a compelling justification for a board’s decision to interfere 
in shareholders’ election of directors. A board’s decision to invoke a 
fiduciary-out clause to prevent the reimbursement of a successful 
candidate would signal to all future candidates that the substantial 
costs of the election process still must be borne by the nominating 
party. The Delaware Supreme Court reiterated in CA, Inc. the 
importance of shareholder participation in the nomination and 
election of directors. To protect shareholders’ fundamental role, the 
Blasius standard should be implemented to ensure shareholders’ 
attempts to nominate candidates are not thwarted by entrenched 
boards of directors. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2004, the shareholders of Computer Associates 
learned that the Department of Justice had indicted their company’s 
former CEO for securities fraud and obstruction of justice.1 The 
company itself had been charged with the same offenses, but it had 
accepted responsibility and agreed to pay $225 million to the victims 
of the fraud to avoid any further prosecution.2 Of course, Computer 
Associates’ shareholders had been suspicious of accounting and 
backdating fraud well before the actual indictment; many executives 
had stepped down, and, by 2004, Computer Associates had become 
“a symbol of weak corporate governance.”3 With the Enron and 
Worldcom accounting scandals still fresh in the minds of both the 
public and federal authorities, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) had promised to keep a “watchful eye” over 
Computer Associates’ corporate governance in the years to follow.4 
 
 1. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Computer Associates Executives Indicted on 
Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/opa/pr/2004/September/04_crm_642.htm. 
 2. Id. Two years later, the two men charged by the Department of Justice—Sanjay 
Kumar, the company’s former CEO, and Stephen Richard—the former head of sales, pled 
guilty. Ex-CA Chief Kumar Pleads Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 25, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/24/technology/kumar/index.htm. 
 3. Richard Waters, Former CA Executives Charged with Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d63c16c8-0cb8-11d9-b543-00000e2511c8.html (“The settlement ends a 
saga in which CA become [sic] a symbol of weak corporate governance and suspect accounting 
in the technology industry.”). 
 4. See Cynthia L. Webb, Hammer Time for Computer Associates, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44284-2004Sep23.html (“CA will be 
under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission for a year and a half under a 
deal with the Justice Department and will have to shell out $225 million to pay back 
shareholders.”). 
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But that same company, operating under the new name CA, Inc. 
(CA), would be fighting its shareholders again only four years later.5 
And thus, in 2008, CA found itself, once again, in the crosshairs of its 
shareholders and at the crossroads of corporate governance. 
The financial crisis that snowballed throughout the United States 
in 2008 only accentuated problems with corporate governance that 
had been in existence for some time.6 The crisis, at times compared to 
the Great Depression,7 left many searching for a readily identifiable 
culprit for the country’s economic malaise. They found easy targets in 
the corporate boardroom.8 The public outcry has brought even 
greater scrutiny of the behavior of corporate America.9 Many argued 
that problems stemmed from a failure to oversee executive 
compensation; indeed, the Obama administration has made efforts to 
create executive compensation oversight.10 But in many ways, 
 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. For further discussion of the protracted debate over proper corporate governance, see 
infra Part I.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Paul B. Farrell, 30 Reasons for Great Depression 2 by 2011, MARKETWATCH, 
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/well-great-depression-2-2011/story.aspx 
?guid=%7BB28B49B5-EFD1-4941-B57E-A2BA1545BA09%7D (noting that the 2008 financial 
downturn might eventually become a second Great Depression). 
 8. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at C1 (discussing lawmakers’ attempts to control executive 
compensation and noting that “[c]ompensation became a big issue in late 2008 when the 
government was forced to step in to cover mounting losses on Wall Street”). 
 9. The SEC recognized the need to react to the economic crisis with potential rule 
changes that indicate greater scrutiny of the current state of corporate governance and 
shareholder participation in the election of directors. The SEC began one such proposed rule 
change with the following strong language: 
  The nation and the markets have recently experienced, and remain in the midst 
of, one of the most serious economic crises of the past century. This crisis has led 
many to raise serious concerns about the accountability and responsiveness of some 
companies and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and has resulted in 
a loss of investor confidence. These concerns have included questions about whether 
boards are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether boards are 
appropriately focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards need to be more 
accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as compensation structures and 
risk management. In light of the current economic crisis and these continuing 
concerns, the Commission has determined to revisit whether and how the federal 
proxy rules may be impeding the ability of shareholders to hold boards accountable 
through the exercise of their fundamental right to nominate and elect members to 
company boards of directors. 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–9049 & 34-
60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
232, 240, 249, 274). 
 10. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 8 (arguing for limitations on director compensation to tie 
performance and compensation); David Stout, Paulson Gives Way on C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/business/economy/25cong.html (discussing 
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executive compensation is merely a red herring and a symptom of 
larger problems.11 Indeed, congressional reaction to the crisis has 
indicated the widespread belief that “among the central causes of the 
financial and economic crises that the United States faces today has 
been a widespread failure of corporate governance.”12 This Note 
suggests that, rather than legislate caps on executive pay and 
bonuses,13 lawmakers could use shareholder oversight of directors as a 
mechanism to help create accountability for those directors’ 
decisions. Because the call for limits on executive compensation is 
actually symbolic of a host of problems with current corporate 
governance, the best solutions may be found through an enhanced 
role for shareholders. The flurry of activity surrounding executive 
compensation likely reflects a political and public sentiment that 
supports greater shareholder activity.14 By protecting shareholders’ 
rights to meaningfully participate in the nomination and election of 
directors, corporate law can ensure that those who own the company15 
ultimately have the ability to ensure the accountability of 
management. 
 
the pressure on Henry Paulson to include limits and regulations on executive compensation 
prior to providing any bailout). 
 11. It is also particularly difficult to quantify the value of executives when relatively small 
distinctions in an executive’s skills or performance can have major impacts on a company’s 
financial success and the return to its investors. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Principles for 
Reforming Executive Pay, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
managing/content/jan2009/ca2009016_165415.htm (listing some of the challenges facing the 
111th Congress with regard to executive pay and the difficulties of balancing appropriate risk-
taking and the public desire for less exorbitant compensation); see also John F. Olson, Professor 
Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,” 93 VA. L. 
REV. 773, 782 (2007) (“[E]ven tiny differences in managerial talent can translate into significant 
disparities in the market value of today’s giant corporations, providing a legitimate rationale for 
offering what may at first glance appear to be excessive compensation.”). 
 12. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (2009). 
 13. See Heineman, supra note 11 (recommending a perspective on executive pay that 
balances risk-taking, which promotes innovation, with responsible management of risk). 
 14. This sentiment is evidenced by the relative success of the “say on pay” legislation as 
well as the importance attributed to shareholders in Senator Charles E. Schumer’s Shareholder 
Bill of Rights proposed legislation. See Joshua Brockman & John Ydstie, Washington Puts the 
Squeeze on Executive Pay, NPR, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=114048511 (noting that Congress is considering legislation that would give 
shareholders more power over executive compensation); see also S. 1074 § 2 (discussing in its 
findings the failure of “executive management and boards of directors . . . to enact 
compensation policies that are linked to the long-term profitability of their institutions”). 
 15. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (9th ed. 2005) (“Traditionally, shares of 
common stock are conceived as ownership or equity interests in the corporation, so that the 
body of common shareholders are the corporation’s owners.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Although the management of a company traditionally controls 
day-to-day operations, the board of directors, strapped with fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders, oversees management and ensures that the 
choices management makes and the company’s general business plan 
are in the best interests of all shareholders. One way to enhance 
shareholder access to board of director elections would be to allow 
shareholders proxy access to the nomination of new directors for a 
company. Proxy access allows shareholders to influence corporate 
policies by presenting their proposals alongside those of the 
management in the proxy voting materials16 distributed by 
management. SEC rules allow shareholders to then vote on the 
entirety of the proposals put forth by both management and other 
shareholders.17 Theoretically, then, shareholders already have the 
capability of nominating and voting new directors onto the board. 
Shareholders can make directors accountable for decisions they make 
that are not in the best interests of the shareholders, including, for 
example, giving excessive compensation to management.18 But 
shareholders’ practical ability to nominate and elect new directors has 
been largely nonexistent due to prohibitive costs and a lack of 
organization.19 Thus, shareholders of some companies have been 
trying to change their company’s bylaws to allow shareholders greater 
participation. 
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,20 the Delaware 
Supreme Court may have signaled a movement toward greater 
 
 16. These materials include both the material necessary for shareholders to designate their 
votes and certain information that the board has determined that shareholders need to make 
such decisions, including, in some cases, shareholder-initiated proposals. See id. at 274–81 
(discussing the disclosures made by registered corporations and the terminology and materials 
used in proxy voting). 
 17. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm (discussing the provisions of Rule 14a-8 and its 
functions within the shareholder proxy context). 
 18. In corporate law, shareholders select the board of directors, which in turn is responsible 
for the hiring and compensation of management. See EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 154–55 
(explaining the basic structure and interactions of corporations in the United States). 
 19. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Shareholder Access to 
the Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1341–42 (discussing the original absence of director 
nominations by shareholders and the cost of proxy elections). Professor Brown also notes that 
the “costs of complying with the rules in many cases render a solicitation [of votes for a director 
nominee] prohibitively expensive.” Id. at 1341 (citing Kenneth J. Bialkin, Why, When and How 
to Conduct a Proxy Context for Corporate Control, in 5 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES ch. 66 
(2006)). 
 20. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
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director accountability to shareholders and greater shareholder proxy 
access to director elections.21 The court determined that a proposal to 
amend CA’s bylaws to require that stockholders be reimbursed for 
reasonable expenses incurred in nominating candidates in a contested 
director election was a permissible subject for a shareholder action 
under Delaware law.22 The court held, however, that the particular 
proposal in question was not allowed under Delaware law because it 
would have required directors to reimburse a candidate, even if doing 
so would require them to violate their fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders.23 But the court indicated that the inclusion of something 
like a fiduciary-out clause would remedy that concern.24 A fiduciary-
out clause requirement, however, could be a major limitation on 
shareholders’ ability to nominate and elect their own candidates 
because directors may exercise broad discretion in claiming the 
protection of these clauses to deny shareholders reimbursement and 
support their own entrenchment on the board. Ordinarily, such board 
decisions would receive deferential treatment from courts under a 
standard known as business judgment deference.25 
This Note argues that Delaware courts should use a stricter 
standard of review when directors attempt to promote entrenchment 
by rejecting reimbursement through reliance on fiduciary-out clauses. 
Because determining the proper standard of review “to judge director 
 
 21. Indeed, in response to CA, Inc. and the financial crisis in general, the SEC has 
proposed rule changes that seek to inject greater shareholder participation into the nomination 
and election of directors. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33-9046 & 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274). 
 22. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
 23. Id. at 238.  
 24. See id., 953 A.2d at 240 (holding that the Bylaw mandating reimbursement for the costs 
of shareholder-nominated candidates was a violation of Delaware law solely because it might, in 
some situations, require the board to violate its fiduciary duty to the company); see also infra 
notes 124–27 and accompanying text. Fiduciary-out clauses usually limit the board of directors. 
See infra Part III.A. Here, they would function to prevent any proxy that passes from requiring 
the directors to reimburse candidates when the directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders would 
otherwise prevent them from doing so. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he 
business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 
A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1976) 
(holding that, absent bad faith, stockholders may not question a board of directors’ exercise of 
its discretion when the board is carrying out ordinary business decisions, such as declaring 
dividends). For further explanation of business judgment deference, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
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action often determines the outcome of the case,”26 preserving the 
meaning of the CA, Inc. decision requires that courts scrutinize 
boards’ attempts to use fiduciary-out clauses under the stricter 
standard introduced in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.27 Part I 
of this Note discusses the corporate governance background leading 
up to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. Part II 
illustrates the specific shareholder rights the court recognized in the 
CA, Inc. opinion. Part III then addresses the lingering questions left 
by the court’s opinion and argues that the inclusion of a fiduciary-out 
clause would place the proposed bylaw in accord with Delaware law, 
thus quieting the court’s concern. Part IV concludes that, given the 
necessity of these fiduciary-out clauses in future bylaws, the Delaware 
Supreme Court must take care to prevent the abuse of such clauses. 
The court should use a Blasius standard of review when any board 
uses a fiduciary-out clause to obstruct shareholder nominees for 
contested director elections. Only the Blasius standard requires the 
appropriate compelling justification for the board’s decision in 
instances in which directors would be likely to try to protect their 
seats on the board.28 
I.  FRAMING THE DEBATE AND STATING 
THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
The debate over the proper methods of corporate governance 
and the appropriate balance between shareholder influence and 
director control is longstanding. In CA, Inc., however, the Delaware 
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of shareholder 
participation in director elections, seemingly taking the pro-
shareholder side of the debate. Within that corporate governance 
context, both the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and 
 
 26. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (citing AC Acquisitions Corp. v. 
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)). 
 27. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 28. This Note does not engage the discussion of whether greater shareholder access is 
beneficial. For a brief discussion of the ongoing debate involving shareholders’ rights to proxy 
access and corporate governance, see infra Part I.A. The assumption herein is that the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s language and conclusions in CA, Inc. indicate that greater access to elections 
via reimbursement is a worthwhile goal for a proxy vote. Thus, to protect what the court asserts, 
and this Note agrees, is a worthwhile end, lower courts must refrain from using deferential 
standards of review for director decisions. Otherwise, the access to director elections enhanced 
by reimbursement will be undercut by director discretion over when to provide those 
reimbursements. 
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SEC rules have a place. And though the SEC has occasionally 
disagreed with the courts when promulgating its rules of corporate 
governance, CA, Inc. marked the first time the SEC allowed the 
Delaware Supreme Court to decide a question addressed to the SEC. 
The result was an implication of deference by the SEC to the 
interpretations of the Delaware Supreme Court. This Part explains 
the background rules and concepts that make clear the importance of 
the CA, Inc. decision. 
A. The Debate Over Shareholder Access and Bylaw Proposals 
One of the key issues in corporate governance is the need for 
oversight to ensure that corporate management does not engage in 
purely self-serving activity.29 The current means of monitoring 
corporate management provide that those who oversee 
management—members of the board of directors—must be truly 
independent from the company.30 But there have been a number of 
problems with the definition of director independence.31 In response 
to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress undertook an effort to help 
shareholders have a greater voice in the face of corporate 
mismanagement.32 One key means of shareholder participation and 
oversight, as previously discussed, is via the proxy contest.33 
Proxy contests were once considered inefficient and were rare 
well into the late 1980s and early 1990s.34 Their importance grew in 
 
 29. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 1339–40 (“With management having an incentive to 
engage in self-serving activities, shareholders need a mechanism designed to minimize this type 
of behavior.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 139, 140 (2009) (book review) (noting that a central concern in the hierarchy of a 
corporation is the temptation that exists when the large amount of wealth created by the 
corporation is placed under the control of the few members that comprise the board). Professor 
Brown utilizes the term “agency cost” to describe the problem of finding an efficient means of 
monitoring corporate managers. Brown, supra note 19, at 1339–40. 
 30. See Brown, supra note 19, at 1340 (“The latest [monitoring system for management] is 
reliance on independent directors to watch out for the interests of shareholders.”). 
 31. Id. at 1340–41 (noting the slew of problems with the current definition of independence 
and concluding that “[a]llowing shareholders to nominate and elect their own candidates 
sidesteps these problems”). 
 32. See supra note 8. 
 33. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 34. See Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial Review of 
Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BUS. LAW. 647, 648 (1992) (noting that the “proxy 
contest for the election of directors continues to be a relatively rare occurrence”). 
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the 1990s, however, due to the increase in institutional investors35 
along with the increase in the ability of boards of directors to thwart 
changes in control launched via tender offers.36 With new, higher-
profile shareholders and institutional investors came new questions; 
conflicts between activist investors and boards of directors created a 
debate about whether shareholders ought to be given oversight of 
director decisionmaking.37 But deference to case-by-case development 
of the law instead of legislation, a tenet of Delaware corporate law,38 
likely led to the slow development of a consistent body of corporate 
governance law.39 In the last decade, however, high-profile board 
crises like that of Hewlett-Packard have stoked the public debate 
over the appropriate level of shareholder participation in corporate 
governance.40 
 
 35. “Institutional investors” in this Note refers to large companies, like pension funds or 
insurance companies, or wealthy individuals that buy and sell large enough quantities of a 
security that they may receive preferential treatment and avoid some regulation because they 
are presumed to be sophisticated. BusinessDictionary.com, Institutional Investors Definition, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/institutional-investors.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2010). 
 36. See Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for 
Proxy Access 1–3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
dir-nominations/silversgarland022004.pdf (stating that “[t]he current vigorous debate on the 
place of shareholder nominated directors in the public company proxy solicitation process” is a 
product of scandals in 2001 as well as the growth of institutional investors and the conclusion 
that “shareholders could not directly hold managers accountable”). 
 37. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 
VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Myth] (discussing the problems with democratic 
oversight by shareholders); Olson, supra note 11 (arguing that Bebchuk “offers scant empirical 
support for either the proposition that shareholders have little power to effect director changes 
or the argument that boosting shareholders’ ability to force such changes will improve 
performance”); E. Norman Veasey, Essay, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A 
Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811 (2007) (contending that shareholder power 
to affect change has actually grown in recent decades); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder 
Access] (arguing for the adoption of measures which would increase shareholder access); Martin 
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003) (contending that “[a]llowing shareholders to run 
an election contest through the company’s proxy statement . . . would be a serious mistake”). 
 38. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2006) (referring to the “inherent conservatism” of Delaware 
corporate law as a product of this case-by-case development of the law). 
 39. See Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 3 (discussing the rise of causes that expedited 
the discussion and development of a corporate governance body of law over director elections). 
 40. See, e.g., Don Clark & Joann S. Lublin, H-P Is Urged to Overhaul Board in Wake of 
Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A2 (describing corporate governance experts’ calls for a 
board overhaul as pension funds seek greater participation in the shareholder nomination 
process); see also The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
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Scholars on one end of the debate, led by Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk of Harvard University, argue for greater shareholder access 
in order to provide a more accountable corporate governance 
system.41 These scholars argue that shareholders currently have no 
meaningful ability to respond to unsatisfactory board actions. 
Because corporate law is built upon an assumption that shareholders 
are the true owners of a corporation,42 the absence of meaningful 
participation reflects a fundamental flaw in the legal justification for 
placing control with and affording deference to the board.43 Bebchuk, 
for example, focuses on enhancing shareholder value in corporations 
as the primary function of management.44 He underscores the 
importance of the board of directors’ fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders, noting that the board is legally the agent of the 
shareholders.45 And these fiduciary duties presuppose an ability on 
the part of shareholders to elect new directors if and when they are 
dissatisfied.46 
 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 33 (2008) (statement of Alan 
Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve) (“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-
interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such is [sic] that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”); J. Robert Brown, 
Jr., Returning Fairness to Executive Compensation, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2008) (“Board 
authority is often better described as exercised in the best interests of management rather than 
shareholders.” (citing The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators, supra)). 
 41. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 676–78 (discussing his general arguments for 
the need for an enhanced shareholder franchise); Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 37, 
at 44–46 (arguing for the need for “[i]nvigorating [c]orporate [e]lections”); see also Silvers & 
Garland, supra note 36, at 16–19 (listing recommendations for the SEC to enhance shareholder 
access to director elections). 
 42. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 109 (noting that shareholders are the true 
owners of corporations). 
 43. See Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder’s Role, Defining a Role for State 
Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 778 (2008) (“[T]he corporate franchise is the 
ideological underpinning on which the core premise of Delaware law rests as the justification for 
permitting directors such broad control over other people’s money.”). See generally Bebchuk, 
Myth, supra note 37 (contending that shareholders do not have the power to hold corporate 
directors accountable); Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 37 (arguing for the adoption of 
measures that would increase shareholder access); Silvers & Garland, supra note 36 (discussing 
the history and current issues associated with proxy access). 
 44. See Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 678 (“I should stress that my analysis of election 
reform in public companies [focuses] on the sole objective of enhancing shareholder value.”). 
 45. Id. at 679–80 (highlighting the role of the shareholder franchise in the philosophical 
underpinnings of current corporate law). 
 46. Id. at 680. 
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But opponents of enhanced shareholder access argue that the 
board of directors should have primary authority,47 and scholars have 
debated the extent to which shareholder bylaw proposals should ever 
be allowed to limit a board of directors’ discretion.48 Those who 
oppose shareholder access do so in part because they believe 
institutional investors and shareholder activists will force a company 
to become focused on short-term gains.49 Some believe that 
“Delaware’s existing statutory and common law suggest that the 
corporate form’s underlying structure is inconsistent with the use of 
mandatory bylaws to control corporate activity and curtail board 
authority.”50 Others, like Professor Lynn Stout, argue that the current 
amount of board control is appropriate because limiting board 
turnover has numerous efficiency advantages.51 These scholars assert 
 
 47. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (concluding that the “power and right to 
exercise decisionmaking fiat” are vested in members of the board of directors, who are not 
“mere agent[s] of the shareholders” but the actual central authority figures); Veasey, supra note 
37, at 816–18 (arguing that the current balance of corporate law is working through a movement 
toward greater corporate governance and shareholder participation without Bebchuk’s 
proposed amendments to legislation); Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 8 (“In order to 
protect shareholders, therefore, the [Business Roundtable] believes the nominating committee 
is best positioned to assess the skills and qualities desirable in new directors.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); cf. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 37, at 82–84 (“There is no 
question that giving shareholders access to the corporate proxy machinery to run an election 
contest would facilitate the nomination and election of dissident and special interest 
directors.”). But see Veasey, supra note 37, at 824 (“If effected by private ordering—whether 
through stockholder-proposed bylaws, changes in the certificate of incorporation, or director-
proposed bylaws—Bebchuk’s proposals, such as confidential voting or reimbursement of 
expenses, are not objectionable.”). Chief Justice Veasey’s criticisms are in line with the point of 
this Note. The very development of law apparent in CA, Inc. indicates the case-by-case trend 
toward greater corporate governance. For this reason, Chief Justice Veasey would likely 
support the development of greater shareholder access to director elections when it occurs 
organically within the Delaware court system. 
 48. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted 
By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 425–33, 479 (1998) (discussing 
arguments regarding the propriety of shareholder oversight of director decisionmaking). 
 49. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 37, at 78 (“[M]any institutional and other 
activist investors have competing interests that may conflict with the best interests of the public 
corporation . . . . Different investors have different time horizons. Some may seek to push the 
corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price so that 
they can turn a quick profit.” (footnote omitted)). 
 50. Fredrick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the 
Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 
749–50 (2008). 
 51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 
789, 790–91 (2007) (arguing that “shareholders enjoy net benefits from board governance” 
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that shareholder access to the boardroom does not actually result in a 
benefit for most shareholders.52 A further complication in this debate 
involves competing interpretations of the DGCL rules that most 
specifically address whether shareholders have a place in the 
management of a corporation.53 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in CA, Inc. did not 
attempt to resolve this debate;54 but, as discussed below, its holding 
supported the court’s previous assertion that “[a] stockholder’s ability 
to participate in corporate governance through the election of 
directors is a fundamental part of our corporate law.”55 Likewise, the 
court has previously stated that “[m]aintaining a proper balance” 
between shareholder participation in the election and the board’s 
actual management depends on “the stockholders’ unimpeded right 
to vote effectively in an election of directors.”56 Given these 
sentiments, the Delaware Supreme Court made a strong statement on 
behalf of shareholders’ rights of access, at least when it comes to the 
election process.57 If the Delaware Supreme Court deems 
shareholders’ access to director elections worth protecting, then other 
courts should strive to avoid undercutting that determination in the 
future. 
B. Resolving the Tension Between the SEC’s Rules and Delaware 
Corporate Law 
The CA, Inc. case exemplified the increasingly murky 
interrelation of Delaware’s traditional authority in corporate law, the 
 
because it “promotes efficient and informed decisionmaking, discourages intershareholder 
opportunism, and encourages valuable specific investments in corporate team production”). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 791–92 (noting “the myth that shareholder control in public companies 
actually benefits shareholders”). 
 53. For further discussion of the possible tension between DGCL Section 141(a) and 
Section 109(b), see infra Part I.B. 
 54. Even critics of shareholder access, though, may grant that shareholder proposals for 
reimbursement of proxy election expenses are acceptable because they deal more closely with 
the election process than with company management. See, e.g., Alexander & Honaker, supra 
note 50, at 766 (noting that such plans may be found less offensive to the “fiduciary decision-
making model” because they are “intended to enhance the stockholders’ ability to elect new 
directors, not to make decisions for the directors that are ultimately elected”). 
 55. Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994). 
 56. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003). 
 57. Again, the distinction between shareholder proposals involving the election process 
and proposals that purport to manage corporate affairs is key. The CA, Inc. opinion does not go 
so far as to claim that corporate management is now in the hands of shareholders, though 
congressional sentiment may support such a move, see supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text. 
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SEC’s influence in the field via its promulgation of corporate 
governance rules and no-action letters, and ultimately the willingness 
of the SEC to defer to Delaware courts. Delaware is incredibly 
influential in the development of corporate law in part because it is 
the state in which the largest American companies choose to 
incorporate.58 More than half of all publicly traded companies in the 
United States are incorporated in Delaware.59 Though the DGCL has 
traditionally been the bedrock of corporate law, the SEC has gained 
increasing prominence60 through the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002.61 The SEC’s enforcement and interpretative role has also 
increased with respect to its corporate governance rules.62 The SEC’s 
expanding influence may be greatest in the area of shareholder 
activism, as many institutional investors are pressing for change 
outside of the DGCL.63 
Although the statutes comprising Delaware corporate law are 
specific in a number of contexts, they are relatively silent in the area 
of corporate governance.64 After the Enron scandal, and again during 
the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government has tried to fill that 
 
 58. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 66 (2009) (“Delaware has visibly succeeded in claiming 
the number one spot in attracting and retaining incorporations. Moreover, the preference for 
Delaware incorporation is especially notable among the richest and most powerful American 
corporations—a fact which undoubtedly contributes to the prestige and influence of Delaware 
corporation law.”). 
 59. The Delaware government’s website boasts of the vast number of companies 
incorporated in Delaware, as well as the state’s welcoming environment for those companies. 
Del. Dep’t of State, Division of Corporations: About Agency, http://corp.delaware.gov/about 
agency.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 60. See, e.g., Margaret E. Tahyar, The Dodd Bill’s Effect on Corporate Governance and 
Executive Compensation Processes, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., 
Nov. 24, 2009, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/11/24/the-dodd-bills-effect-on 
-corporate-governance-and-executive-compensation-processes/#more-5627 (“The project of 
federalizing major elements of our corporate governance and executive compensation processes 
continues apace.”). Tahyar discusses the potential effects of proposed legislation in the arena of 
corporate governance, including an expanded role for the SEC. Id. 
 61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.). 
 62. Stevelman, supra note 58, at 90. 
 63. Cf. id. at 95–96 (“These [shareholder activist] forces are operating outside of the 
traditional framework of state corporate law—that is, without amendment to the DGCL and 
separate and apart from the judicial development of fiduciary standards. In prior periods, 
corporate directors, officers, and their advisers could more easily insulate themselves from 
shareholders’ demands and expectations.”). 
 64. See Thompson, supra note 43, at 776 (noting that there is a space left open within the 
realm of corporate governance under Delaware law). 
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void.65 Much of the federal law in the corporate governance arena can 
be traced to Rule 14a-8, which provides a means for shareholders to 
bring proposals to the board to be included in the proxy statements 
that are then distributed to all of the company’s shareholders.66 When 
shareholders seek to include a proposal in a company’s proxy 
materials and management wants to exclude it, it is the SEC that 
often determines who wins.67 Some of these determinations, however, 
depend on state and not federal law. At times, then, there are 
questions that must be answered in the space between Delaware’s 
corporate law and the SEC’s oversight of director behavior and proxy 
solicitation. 
On the Delaware law side of the equation, the ability of 
shareholders to adopt bylaws is in tension with the ability of directors 
to manage the company unfettered.68 The tension exists specifically 
between DGCL Sections 109(b) and 141(a).69 Section 109(b), which 
addresses the appropriate content for bylaws, states that “the bylaws 
may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the 
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the 
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
 
 65. Id. at 776, 783. See generally Junis L. Baldon, Taking a Backseat: How Delaware Can 
Alter the Role of the SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 
105 (2009) (discussing the intertwined roles of federal and state law in corporate governance 
and the potential effects of an enhanced relationship between the SEC and the Delaware 
Supreme Court). 
 66. Thompson, supra note 43, at 779. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 780 (“If management opposes the inclusion of the proposal, which is 
often the case, management asks the SEC staff for a no-action letter, in effect, the staff’s 
announcement that it would bring no enforcement action against the company were the 
proposal to be omitted from the company’s proxy statement. The agency’s response comes in 
[an SEC no-action letter] sent by a SEC staff member to the parties.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. See Hamermesh, supra note 48, at 444 (characterizing the tension in DGCL rules by 
stating that “the efforts to distinguish by-laws that permissibly limit director authority from by-
laws that impermissibly do so have failed to provide a coherent analytical structure”); see also 
Alexander & Honaker, supra note 50, at 753 (“Some commentators, however, posited a tension 
between sections 141(a) and 109(b), suggesting that the provisions of the DGCL, standing 
alone, would not resolve the question whether the bylaws may place limits on the board’s power 
to manage the corporation.”). 
 69. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008) 
(discussing the interrelation of DGCL rules and concluding that “[t]he question left unanswered 
is what is the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits yet does not improperly 
intrude upon the directors’ power to manage corporation’s business and affairs under Section 
141(a)”). 
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employees.”70 That section, when read in conjunction with Section 
109(a), appears to limit the subject matter that a bylaw can address. 
Section 141(a), however, provides that “[t]he business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”71 Section 141(a), then, purports to provide for the 
management of the company’s business affairs only by the board of 
directors.72 Thus, tension arises when shareholders propose a bylaw 
that the board of directors contends interferes with its management of 
the company. 
In addition to Delaware law, SEC rules govern certain actions by 
boards and shareholders. Rule 14a-8 generally allows a board of 
directors to exclude certain bylaw proposals from the distributed 
proxy statement, the actual material that the directors send to 
shareholders.73 The premise is that this rule helps preserve the board’s 
ability to make ordinary business decisions. In 2006, a portion of the 
rule, Rule 14a-8(i)(8), was subject to conflicting interpretations by the 
Second Circuit and the SEC. Rule 14a-8(i)(8) provided that 
companies may exclude a proposal “[i]f the proposal relates to an 
election for membership on the company’s board of directors or 
analogous body.”74 In AFSCME, Employees Pension Plan v. 
American International Group, Inc.,75 a case that involved a similar 
question to the one ultimately raised in CA, Inc., the Second Circuit 
was forced to answer whether a shareholder proposal could be 
excluded under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8).76 The Second Circuit held that 
a shareholder proposal requiring American International Group 
(AIG) to allow shareholder nomination and election of candidates for 
the board of directors could not be excluded from the company’s 
proxy statement.77 The court held that the 14a-8(i)(8) election 
exception only applied to bylaw proposals that would affect particular 
 
 70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2009). 
 71. Id. § 141(a). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009). 
 74. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8). 
 75. AFSCME, Employees Pension Plan v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 76. Id. at 125. 
 77. Id. at 131. 
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elections, not the election process generally.78 The decision was met 
with a great deal of optimism from advocates of greater shareholder 
oversight, but scholars waited for the SEC’s response.79 
The SEC condemned the Second Circuit’s conclusion and 
amended the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(8),80 nullifying the effect of 
the AIG case. The Commission’s comments specifically state that 
proposals such as the one at issue in AIG would be excludable under 
the amended rule.81 The comments also note that, although this new 
encapsulation of the rule is more expansive in its application to 
nominations and procedures, “the changes to the rule text relate only 
to procedures that would result in a contested election, either in the 
year in which the proposal is submitted or in subsequent years.”82 The 
SEC left the door open for proposals, like that in CA, Inc., that make 
future contested elections more likely but do not necessarily result in 
any particular election in a given year. Regardless, the conflict 
between the Second Circuit and the SEC only underscores the 
murkiness and unpredictability of the law surrounding corporate 
governance. Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to claim that “[i]n 
no other area of corporate governance has the interrelation between 
state and federal law become more important than the validity of 
shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.”83 Yet it has become 
increasingly difficult to actually distinguish between state and federal 
law in the area of corporate governance.84 
Tension was particularly problematic when Delaware corporate 
law, the cornerstone of traditional corporate law, conflicted with the 
SEC’s interpretation and enforcement of its own rules. In 2007, to 
help avoid conflicting interpretations by the Delaware courts and the 
SEC, Delaware amended its constitution to allow the SEC to certify 
 
 78. Id. at 129–30. 
 79. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 708 (noting the importance of the court’s 
opinion but also awaiting the SEC’s response). 
 80. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8) (noting the potential confusion the Second Circuit’s decision may have caused and 
the need to clarify the meaning of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)). 
 81. Id. at 70,454. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Baldon, supra note 65, at 106. 
 84. See id. (“[I]n fact, these roles are so intertwined that it becomes difficult to tell a 
coherent story about discrete federal versus state law and analysis.” (quoting Robert B. Ahdieh, 
From Federal Rules to Intersystemic Governance in Securities Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233, 
235 (2007))). 
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questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.85 The 
amendment created an “expedited process for addressing corporate 
law issues” and was aimed at bringing “greater certainty” to 
corporate law.86 CA, Inc. was noteworthy because it was the first 
instance in which the SEC chose to utilize this certification 
capability.87 Previously, only other courts could certify questions of 
law to the Delaware Supreme Court, and it was somewhat unclear 
whether the SEC would even choose to exercise this ability, as it was 
considered a showing of deference.88 Because corporate governance is 
an area of particularly hot debate, some expected that it would be the 
area in which the SEC might be most likely to need to send questions 
to the court.89 
The importance of the SEC’s certification of questions, 
particularly questions relating to corporate governance, cannot be 
overstated. The sentiment leading up to the CA, Inc. decision was 
that the case would be a landmark determination of key corporate 
governance questions as well as a means of providing a single voice in 
 
 85. Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, Delaware Constitutional Amendment Enacted 
Allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission to Bring Questions of Law Directly to the 
Delaware Supreme Court (May 15, 2007), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ 
Supreme%20Court/pdf/?deconstamend051507pdf.pdf; see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) 
(amended 2007) (providing the Delaware Supreme Court with the jurisdiction “[t]o hear and 
determine questions of law certified to it by . . . the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission”). 
 86. Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, supra note 85; cf. J.W. Verret, Federal vs. State 
Law: The SEC’s New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 12, 12, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1156527 (“This ability to provide advisory opinions, if utilized by the SEC, is poised to 
enhance Delaware’s dominance as the state of incorporation for publicly traded corporations.”). 
 87. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, DELAWARE 
SUPREME COURT ANSWERS QUESTIONS CERTIFIED BY SEC; REJECTS STOCKHOLDER BYLAW 
REQUIRING REIMBURSEMENT OF PROXY SOLICITATION EXPENSES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=1426 (noting that this decision 
marked the first instance of the SEC certifying questions directly to the Delaware Supreme 
Court); see also William D. Johnston, Del. Court Responds to SEC’s First Certified Questions, 
VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.valawyersweekly.com/weeklyedition/2008/09/29 
/del-court-responds-to-sec%E2%80%99s-first-certified-questions/ (detailing the process for the 
first certification and the subsequent decision). 
 88. See Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, supra note 85 (“It is not clear how often the 
Securities and Exchange Commission will accept Delaware’s invitation [to certify questions], 
particularly in controversial areas of corporate governance.” (quoting Jeffrey D. Bauman, 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center)). 
 89. See Verret, supra note 86, at 12–13 (discussing and predicting the certification of 
questions dealing with the proposal of bylaws that might limit a board’s discretion). 
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areas that involved overlapping and often contradictory authorities.90 
CA, Inc. was anticipated as “the most significant corporate law case in 
probably 10 years.”91 Professor J.W. Verret of George Mason Law 
School argued that the court’s decision might change securities and 
corporate law in a manner unseen since the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1933.92 And because the SEC certified the questions to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, the SEC likely would not have the option 
to then override the court’s decision as it did in AIG.93 Thus, the 
rationale of the court is important, as it speaks for itself and for the 
SEC. 
II.  THE CA, INC. DECISION 
In CA, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court helped define the 
contours of permissible shareholder activism within the context of 
board of director oversight and company management. The court 
determined that a shareholder bylaw proposal that called for 
reimbursement of dissident director candidates was a proper subject 
matter for a shareholder proposal under Delaware law.94 That 
determination reflected the court’s belief that such proposals dealt 
with the process of the election of directors, which is a proper subject 
for shareholder input.95 The court found, however, that the proposal 
violated Delaware law because it left no discretion to the board of 
directors to decline reimbursement when it would cause the board to 
violate its fiduciary duties to shareholders.96 Ultimately, the case 
 
 90. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, SEC Sends Proxy Question to Delaware, COMPLIANCE 
WKLY., July 15, 2008, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/4258/sec-sends-proxy-question-
to-delaware (outlining the various reactions to the SEC’s certification of its first question to the 
Delaware Supreme Court). 
 91. Id. (quoting Charles Elson, Director, Corporate Governance Center at the University 
of Delaware). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Indeed, as a result of the CA, Inc. decision, both the DGCL and the SEC contemplated 
rule changes to incorporate the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision. The DGCL changes have 
passed. The SEC proposed its rule change in May, but because of a large number of responses, 
the final vote will not take place until sometime this year. Jesse Westbrook, SEC to Delay 
Proxy-Access Rule, Giving Banks Reprieve, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 2, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2ZCxme0W84Y. For the text of the 
SEC’s proposed rule, see Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33–9049 & 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274). 
 94. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See infra Part II.B. 
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articulated a role for shareholders in the nomination process for 
directors so long as future bylaw proposals carve out sufficient 
discretion for the board of directors. 
A. Factual Background 
In March 2008, the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), a stockholder of CA,  proposed a 
stockholder bylaw (Bylaw) for CA to include in the proxy materials it 
would distribute during the 2008 proxy season.97 CA, formerly 
Computer Associates, had a history of corporate governance 
shortcomings, and AFSCME, a shareholder activist pension group, 
proposed the Bylaw partially in response to a series of previous 
problems.98 The proposed Bylaw required, most importantly, that CA 
reimburse a stockholder for the reasonable expenses involved in 
connection with a stockholder-nominated candidate’s run for the CA 
board of directors.99 The proposal required reimbursement for 
expenses of all candidates of the nominating party so long as, among 
other conditions, one of the nominating party’s candidates was 
successfully elected.100 The amount reimbursed could not exceed the 
amount spent by the corporation in connection with the same 
contested election.101 This proposal, if successful, would have removed 
some discretion from the board, which previously had complete 
discretion regarding the reimbursement of proxy contest expenses.102 
CA wanted to exclude this proposal from its proxy materials and 
thus sought permission from the SEC in the form of an SEC no-action 
letter, which would ensure that the SEC would not take action against 
CA for the exclusion of the proposal.103 Because Rule 14a-8 allows 
companies to exclude proposals that would violate the law of the 
company’s state of incorporation, the SEC received separate opinions 
from counsel for AFSCME and CA regarding the validity of the 
 
 97. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229. 
 98. For a discussion of Computer Associates’ “weak corporate governance” and its 
backdating and accounting issues during the early- to mid-2000s, see supra notes 1–4 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229–30. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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proposed Bylaw under Delaware law.104 The SEC received conflicting 
opinions from Delaware counsel regarding the likely outcome under 
Delaware law, so the SEC exercised its power to certify questions to 
the Delaware Supreme Court.105 The first question was whether the 
proposed Bylaw covered a proper subject for shareholder action 
under Delaware law. Specifically, the SEC sought a determination of 
the “scope or reach of the shareholders’ power to adopt, alter or 
repeal the bylaws of a Delaware corporation” and whether the Bylaw 
fell within that scope.106 The second question was whether the 
adoption of the specific proposal would cause CA to violate Delaware 
law.107 
B. The Court’s Holding and Unresolved Questions 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that, although the proposal 
covered an appropriate subject matter,108 CA could exclude the 
proposed Bylaw because its adoption would violate Delaware law by 
restricting the fiduciary duties of the board of directors to the 
shareholders.109 The court first made clear that “[t]he shareholders of 
a Delaware corporation have the right ‘to participate in selecting the 
contestants’ for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled 
to facilitate the exercise of that right by proposing a bylaw that would 
encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nominees to stand 
for election.”110 The court went to great lengths to illustrate that 
decisions involving reimbursement affect director elections and not 
simply corporate affairs, and thus do not deserve the same deference 
usually given to directors under the business judgment rule.111 In 
holding that the Bylaw was a proper subject for shareholder action, 
the court noted that the “purpose of the Bylaw [was] to promote the 
integrity of [the] electoral process by facilitating the nomination of 
director candidates by stockholders,” thereby reiterating the positive 
 
 104. See Baldon, supra note 65, at 116–18 (discussing the steps taken by the SEC in 
attempting to respond to CA’s request for a no-action letter). 
 105. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 230. 
 106. Id. at 231–32. 
 107. Id. at 231; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation 
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 663 (2008) (noting that the SEC certified these two questions). 
 108. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
 109. Id. at 240. 
 110. Id. at 237 (quoting Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. 
Ch. 2002)). 
 111. Id. at 234. For further discussion of business judgment deference, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
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potential effects of the Bylaw’s underlying purpose.112 The court 
viewed these potential effects as laudable, finding the proposed 
Bylaw’s subject matter to be in accord with the court’s reverence for 
the integrity of the election process. 
The Delaware Supreme Court went out of its way to explain the 
importance of the election process and the underlying necessity of 
protecting shareholder participation in director elections through the 
Bylaw in question. The court explained that because the Bylaw dealt 
with the process of electing directors, it covered a subject matter in 
which the shareholders had a legitimate and protected interest.113 
“The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that right 
by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than 
board-sponsored nominees to stand for election,” which the Bylaw 
would achieve.114 
Despite its apparent admiration for the intent of the Bylaw, the 
court held that the Bylaw, as worded, violated Delaware law.115 The 
Bylaw would have forced CA’s board to reimburse successful 
dissident candidates even when the reimbursement would cause the 
board to violate its fiduciary duties.116 The court hypothesized an 
instance in which a dissident candidate is elected despite running for 
purely personal reasons.117 This scenario is improbable given that 
purely personal motivations are unlikely to command a majority of 
shareholder votes.118 Still, the court was adamant about the need to 
 
 112. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237; see also Baldon, supra note 65, at 118 (noting that the court 
held the Bylaw proper after its determination that the proposal was process related). 
 113. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237; see also Baldon, supra note 65, at 118 (reciting the ways in 
which the court found the Bylaw process related). 
 114. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
 115. Id. at 240. 
 116. See id. (“[T]he Bylaw mandates reimbursement of election expenses in circumstances 
that a proper application of fiduciary principles could preclude. That such circumstances could 
arise is not far fetched. Under Delaware law, a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse 
proxy expenses ‘[w]here the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished 
from personnel o[r] management.’ But in a situation in which the proxy contest is motivated by 
personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those 
of the corporation, the board’s fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be denied 
altogether.” (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also Baldon, 
supra note 65, at 119 (noting that “[t]he Court held that the board’s fiduciary duties outweighed 
the merits of the proposed bylaw”). 
 117. CA., Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 118. See Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 8 (“[I]t appears highly unlikely that in a widely 
held company a nominee intent upon using his or her directorship to pursue an agenda at odds 
with the interests of the corporation and its shareholders should be elected.”); see also Posting 
of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/whats-next-for 
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protect directors’ fiduciary duties without explicitly articulating the 
type of clause that would assure those protections.119 The requirement 
that the reimbursement be only for “reasonable” expenses was 
insufficient because it only enabled the board to determine the 
“amount of reimbursement [that] is appropriate” and did not 
“reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary 
duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate . . . to award 
reimbursement at all.”120 Thus, a situation may arise in which the 
board’s duties to its shareholders would require it to refuse any 
reimbursement, yet the Bylaw did not carve out this ability. 
C. The Court Implies a Fiduciary-Out Clause Could Remedy 
Its Concerns 
Although the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the 
proposed Bylaw could be excluded, it seemingly went out of its way 
to indicate that the Bylaw might be permissible if it were amended in 
certain ways, such as by changing its wording to reserve to directors 
their full fiduciary duties.121 The court even concluded its opinion by 
stating that, “[i]n arriving at this conclusion, [this Court] express[es] 
no view on whether the Bylaw, as currently drafted, would create a 
better governance scheme from a policy standpoint.”122 The court 
limited its ruling by noting that the problems are with the Bylaw “as 
written,” thus leaving open the possibility that amending the language 
would be a sufficient remedy.123 
 
.html (July 21, 2008) (“[T]o the extent that a candidate (motivated by personal reasons) is 
successful, can’t that somehow suggest that shareholders believe her service will benefit the 
corporation? In this regard, it may prove difficult to determine when a candidacy is solely 
personal . . . .”). 
 119. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234 (“The question left unanswered is what is the scope of 
[permissible] shareholder action that . . . does not improperly intrude upon the directors’ power 
to manage corporation’s business and affairs. . . . To resolve that issue, the Court must resort to 
different tools, namely, decisions of this Court and of the Court of Chancery that bear on this 
question. Those tools do not enable us to articulate with doctrinal exactitude a bright line that 
divides those bylaws that shareholders may unilaterally adopt . . . from those which they may 
not.”). 
 120. Id. at 240 (emphasis omitted). 
 121. See id. (noting that the Bylaw, as presently drafted, is impermissible because it fails to 
include a clause reserving directors’ right to exercise fiduciary duties); see also McDonnell, 
supra note 107, at 664 (noting that the lack of a fiduciary out is damning to a shareholder-
proposed bylaw after CA, Inc.). 
 122. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 123. See id. (“It is in this respect that the proposed Bylaw, as written, would violate 
Delaware law if enacted by CA’s shareholders.” (emphasis added)); see also Joseph Antignani, 
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Early in the opinion, however, the court hints at the simplest 
means to bring the Bylaw into compliance with Delaware law.124 In 
footnote twenty, the court signaled that something like the inclusion 
of a fiduciary-out clause might make the proposed Bylaw 
acceptable.125 This interpretation is underscored by the court’s 
discussion later in the opinion about the potential dilemma that 
would arise if a contested election were won by a challenger who ran 
only out of personal motivations.126 A fiduciary-out clause would 
reserve to directors the right to withhold reimbursement in instances 
in which a candidate clearly ran for election for personal gain.127 
An important question the Delaware Supreme Court did not 
answer was specifically how AFSCME could amend its proposal to 
ensure that its adoption would not violate Delaware law. The court, 
however, indicated a shortcoming in the proposed Bylaw, perhaps 
pointing shareholders in the proper direction for future proposal 
language.128 The next Part of this Note will explain how similar 
proposals in the future can be constructed to meet the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s requirements. 
 
Note, Delaware to the Rescue: A Proper Exercise of Deference by the SEC and the Future 
Implications of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 431, 452 (2009) 
(arguing that “it is true that a bylaw similar to the one AFSCME proposed (that contains a 
fiduciary-out clause) is now valid”). 
 124. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 236 n.20 (noting that the process-related nature of the Bylaw 
could be emphasized by changing the Bylaw’s language and including a clause that reserves to 
directors the ability to exercise fiduciary duties). 
 125. See id. (“[T]he Bylaw could have been phrased more benignly . . . . [I]t would also need 
to contain a provision that reserves the director’s full power to discharge their fiduciary 
duties.”). Though the court does not specifically state that the fiduciary-out clause would be 
sufficient to make the proposed Bylaw acceptable, the court’s opinion seems to indicate that the 
only basis for allowing the company to exclude the proposal was the fact that the proposal 
obligated directors to act, in some cases, contrary to their fiduciary duties to shareholders. See, 
e.g., id. at 240 (approving the Bylaw’s exclusion “because the Bylaw contains no language or 
provision that would reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary duty to 
decide whether or not [reimbursement] would be appropriate, in a specific case”). 
 126. See id. at 239–40 (discussing the “not far fetched” possibility of a candidate running 
solely for personal reasons). 
 127. See Antignani, supra note 123, at 452 (“[A] bylaw similar to the one AFSCME 
proposed (that contains a fiduciary-out clause) is now valid.”). But see Posting of Lisa Fairfax to 
The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (“[I]t seems that differentiating between campaigns that are 
purely personal and those that are not may prove difficult.”). 
 128. For further discussion of the ways in which the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause is 
appropriate under Delaware law, see infra Part III. 
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III.  THE IMPLIED SOLUTION: A FIDUCIARY-OUT CLAUSE 
In CA, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court signaled how future 
shareholder bylaws dealing with the election process could satisfy the 
court’s requirement for the protection of directors’ fiduciary duties. 
Specifically, the court’s examples of problematic scenarios could all 
be ameliorated by the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause, which would 
permit sufficient director flexibility in those rare instances in which a 
bylaw would require actions inconsistent with a director’s fiduciary 
duties to the company’s shareholders. 
A. Fiduciary-Out Clauses: Current Usage and Judicial Treatment 
A fiduciary-out clause is simply a means of reconciling certain 
actions taken by a board of directors with its underlying obligation to 
shareholders.129 Used primarily in the merger and acquisition context, 
fiduciary outs are contract provisions that typically allow a target 
corporation to renege on the performance of contractual obligations 
when the board determines that such performance would violate the 
board’s duties to shareholders.130 An issue arises when an otherwise 
acceptable board or shareholder action binds the board and prevents 
it from discharging its fiduciary duties down the line.131 In the merger 
context, fiduciary-out clauses were the product of courts requiring 
boards to invalidate no-shop provisions—which prevented companies 
from seeking better offers once they had engaged in negotiations with 
a buyer—and other exclusivity agreements in the event of the 
 
 129. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938–39 (Del. 2003) 
(explaining that fiduciary-out clauses prevent a board from binding itself to actions that may be 
to the detriment of shareholders). For a general discussion of the role of fiduciary-out clauses in 
the merger and acquisition context, in which they are used to protect directors’ ability to breach 
an agreement when breaching is in the best interest of shareholders, see generally William T. 
Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 653 (2000). 
 130. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 129, at 656 (noting the ability of boards to contract around 
the normal costs of efficient breach because of such provisions); David B. Chubak, Note, 
Locking in the Lock-Up? Orman v. Cullman & Corporate Deal Protection Measures, 1 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 457, 465 n.47 (2005) (“A fiduciary-out clause has its basis in the restrictions placed 
on fiduciaries so that they are not induced into violating their duty to beneficiaries. The section 
heading states: ‘A promise by a fiduciary to violate his fiduciary duty or a promise that tends to 
induce such a violation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (2005))). 
 131. See Allen, supra note 129, at 656 (discussing the importance and operation of fiduciary-
out clauses in these situations). 
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inevitable sale of the company.132 In the context of shareholder-
proposed bylaws, fiduciary-out clauses have never been used before.  
The Delaware Supreme Court discussed the nature and 
importance of fiduciary-out clauses in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc.,133 explaining the difficulties in balancing a director’s 
fiduciary duties and his ability to cede decisionmaking power through 
certain agreements.134 In Omnicare, the court held that a fiduciary-out 
clause needed to be included in the agreement between the acquiring 
company and the target corporation to protect minority shareholders 
in the event that the board of the target corporation received a 
superior offer.135 The board of directors’ omission of such a clause 
thereby invalidated its attempts to create an agreement with a 
company that had proposed a merger.136 In the court’s view, a 
fiduciary-out clause was a necessary part of the merger agreement and 
the accompanying deal protections the board had chosen to provide 
its initial suitor.137 The court’s insistence on the inclusion of a fiduciary 
out is based on the board’s “continuing fiduciary responsibilities to 
the minority stockholders.”138 The contractual expectations of the 
merging company “must yield to the supervening responsibility of the 
directors to discharge their fiduciary duties on a continuing basis.”139  
By analogy, if the Delaware Supreme Court found it necessary to 
include a fiduciary out in instances in which the board and the 
majority voting shareholders obtained a lock-up, it makes sense that 
the court would seek to ensure equal protection of minority 
shareholders in the event that a candidate’s election was not in the 
best interests of the company. In Omnicare, the majority’s sentiments 
seem to indicate that fiduciary outs will be a future requirement for 
 
 132. See, e.g., Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938 (describing the requirement for fiduciary-out 
clauses to prevent a board “from effectively discharging its ongoing fiduciary responsibilities”). 
 133. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 134. See id. at 936–39 (concluding that the board could not simply abdicate its fiduciary 
duties and depend on a shareholder vote in light of the fact that the vote’s outcome was a 
foregone conclusion). 
 135. Id. at 936 (“To the extent that a [merger] contract, or a provision thereof, purports to 
require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is 
invalid and unenforceable.” (alteration in original) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993))). 
 136. Id. at 939. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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actions that uniformly constrain a board’s judgment.140 This makes it 
more likely that a fiduciary out in a proposal similar to the Bylaw in 
CA, Inc. would satisfy the court’s concern that board discretion has 
been unduly or at least automatically eliminated. 
B. When Including Fiduciary-Out Clauses Makes Sense 
Including a fiduciary-out clause to protect shareholders makes 
sense when the clause is in place to prevent boards from binding 
themselves to the detriment of shareholders. Although a fiduciary-out 
clause is a proper protection to ensure that a board can always 
exercise its obligations to shareholders, such a clause should not be 
seen as a restriction on shareholder action.141 It is important to note 
that the discussion of fiduciary duties involved in a potential 
shareholder bylaw proposal is inherently different than the role of 
fiduciary duties in a takeover context. As the Delaware Court of 
Chancery noted in Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp.,142 fiduciary duties to 
shareholders should not be used as a defense to mute shareholder 
proposals and nominations.143 The logic is that fiduciary duties exist to 
ensure that directors act in the interests of shareholders. Underlying 
that assumption, however, is the notion that shareholders cannot 
always specify the course of action they desire. When, as in instances 
of a shareholder vote, the shareholders demonstrate their specific 
desire, it no longer makes sense to allow a board to argue that its 
fiduciary duties to those shareholders prevent it from following their 
vote.144 Thus, when a bylaw is supported by a majority of shareholders 
 
 140. See id. at 945–46 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (raising the possibility that the inclusion of 
fiduciary outs may become a more uniform rule in instances limiting director discretion). 
 141. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
20, 2005) (stating that the use of fiduciary-out clauses as a restriction on shareholder action 
“misconceives the nature and purpose of fiduciary duties”). 
 142. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). 
 143. See id. at *8 (explaining that, after shareholders have expressly voiced their desires, 
there is no longer a need for the gap-filling of fiduciary duties). 
 144. See, e.g., id. (“Fiduciary duties exist in order to fill the gaps in the contractual 
relationship between the shareholders and directors of the corporation. Fiduciary duties cannot 
be used to silence shareholders and prevent them from specifying what the corporate contract is 
to say. Shareholders should be permitted to fill a particular gap in the corporate contract if they 
wish to fill it. This point can be made by reference to principles of agency law: Agents 
frequently have to act in situations in which they do not know exactly how their principal would 
like them to act. In such situations, the law says the agent must act in the best interests of the 
principal. When the principal wishes to make known to the agent exactly which actions the 
principal wishes to be taken, the agent cannot refuse to listen on the grounds that this is not in 
the best interests of the principal.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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and a vote has been cast by a majority of shareholders in favor of a 
particular candidate, courts should be reluctant to allow the specific 
demonstration of shareholder preference to be undermined or 
contradicted by the board of directors’ attempt to utilize a fiduciary-
out clause. To allow liberal use of a fiduciary-out clause would be to 
turn the clause against those it was meant to protect. 
Because future proposals are likely to heed the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s advice and include fiduciary-out clauses,145 the next 
step in the analysis is to choose an appropriate standard of review. 
The standard that courts use to review board actions when invoking 
fiduciary-out clauses ultimately will dictate the effect those clauses 
have. The next Part of this Note will explain why a Blasius standard 
of review, a stringent standard, is necessary to protect the rights of 
shareholders recognized by the court in CA, Inc. 
IV.  ADVOCATING AN APPROPRIATELY STRICT  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
If shareholders include fiduciary-out clauses in future bylaw 
proposals regarding election reimbursement, courts must be wary 
when directors seek to exercise discretion in using those clauses to 
block reimbursement.146 The inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause has 
the potential to make a shareholder-proposed bylaw useless if a board 
 
 145. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that one solution to the problem noted 
in CA, Inc. “is for shareholders to include fiduciary duty outs in all bylaw proposals that are 
potentially subject to this objection (which may well be all bylaw proposals, period)”); see also 
Office Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 264, at *1 (Mar. 9, 2009) 
(refusing to concur with the exclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw that included a 
fiduciary-out provision and was otherwise almost identical to the one proposed by AFSCME). 
 146. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that the addition of fiduciary-out clauses 
to bylaws “leaves boards with a degree of discretion that may go against the very point of these 
bylaws, which seek to limit board discretion in areas in which the shareholders do not trust the 
board”); see also 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 18:26.20 (2008) 
(observing that “[a] fiduciary-out clause grants the board broad authority, but presumably 
permits the proponents [of the candidate] an avenue to challenge whether the board breached 
its fiduciary duties” when it exercised the fiduciary-out clause). In fact, Professor McDonnell 
has argued that this potential for directors to abuse any ability to amend or reject shareholder 
bylaws necessitates the elimination of director fiduciary duties with respect to such bylaws. 
McDonnell, supra note 107, at 669. But the elimination of fiduciary duties, which is McDonnell’s 
suggested fix, would not be necessary if courts invoke a strict standard to scrutinize any director 
interference with such bylaws. 
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has discretion in exercising its fiduciary out.147 The Blasius standard of 
review, reserved for instances in which the board of directors 
interferes directly with the election process for directors, is the proper 
standard for judging directors’ invocation of a fiduciary-out clause in 
the reimbursement context. 
A. Why the Judicial Standard of Review Matters 
If shareholders follow the breadcrumbs left by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, future proposals will include fiduciary-out clauses to 
reserve some power to directors, making it more likely that a bylaw 
will not violate Delaware law by invalidating the directors’ fiduciary 
obligations to the shareholders.148 This would be a significant step 
toward greater shareholder participation, but the inclusion of 
fiduciary-out clauses could render the laudable purpose of the 
proposed Bylaw moot.149 Future cases will likely force Delaware 
courts to determine a standard of review for the exercise of these 
fiduciary outs,150 and as the Delaware Supreme Court has itself noted, 
 
 147. See Antignani, supra note 123, at 452–53 (arguing that “a fiduciary-out clause makes 
the mandatory reimbursement provision useless” in the event that such clauses lead to 
protracted litigation and the real possibility that expenses will not be reimbursed). 
 148. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1–2 (discussing a shareholder proposal 
that echoed the CA, Inc. proposal but included the language “consistent with its fiduciary 
duties” to provide the board with the necessary fiduciary out). The SEC concluded that Office 
Depot could not exclude the proposal. Id. at *1. As is the SEC’s convention, it did not elaborate 
on the legal reasoning behind its decision; however, the attached correspondence from the 
parties demonstrates that the parties believed that the holding of CA, Inc. would determine the 
SEC’s decision. See id. at *15 (“Both [AFSCME’s] and Office Depot’s lawyers acknowledge 
that the legality of the proposed bylaw is resolved under [CA, Inc.]. Office Depot’s only 
complaint is that, in its opinion and the opinion of its counsel, the ‘fiduciary out’ provided in 
[AFSCME’s] proposed bylaw somehow is not good enough to satisfy the requirements set forth 
in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision.”). 
 149. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (noting the 
“possibility that [the inclusion of a fiduciary out] would enable directors to challenge the 
payment of expenses for every successful candidate, thereby defeating shareholders’ purpose in 
adopting the bylaw”); see also McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (concluding that if fiduciary 
outs are required in all proposed bylaws, the result “leaves boards with a degree of discretion 
that may go against the very point of these bylaws, which seek to limit board discretion in areas 
in which the shareholders do not trust the board”). 
 150. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that “[o]ne fix [to the deficiency of the 
CA Bylaw] is for shareholders to include fiduciary duty outs in all bylaw proposals”); see also 
Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (arguing that the potential for 
protracted litigation over reimbursement might also be a deterrent for those who would 
otherwise nominate directors). 
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this determination is critical.151 The inclusion of fiduciary-out clauses 
does not make proposals useless as long as courts subject directors’ 
use of such fiduciary outs to a strict standard of review. 
Imagine that AFSCME had included the following fiduciary-out 
clause in the Bylaw: “Reimbursement is mandatory to the extent that 
the reimbursement is consistent with the directors’ fiduciary duties.”152 
This clause would have muted the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
primary concern,153 presumably smoothing the way for including the 
shareholder proposal in the company’s proxy materials and 
presenting it to the shareholders for a vote. But it is likely that, given 
the directors’ resistance to the inclusion of these bylaws and similar 
proposals in the first place, the directors will desire to prevent the 
inclusion of future bylaws and the exercise of the powers contained 
therein.154 Thus, the board of directors could use the fiduciary-out 
clause as a veto, simply refusing to reimburse the “short slate”155 
candidates for the previous contest. This would not only defeat the 
purpose of the bylaw by making the contests just as expensive for 
 
 151. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (“[I]dentification 
of the correct analytical framework is essential to a proper judicial review of challenges to the 
decision-making process of a corporation’s board of directors.”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. 
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del. 1995) (noting that because of the distinction between the 
leniency of business judgment deference and the exacting nature of heightened forms of 
scrutiny, “the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is 
determinative of the outcome of [the] litigation” (alteration in original) (quoting Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989))). 
 152. This language mirrors the language included by shareholders of Office Depot in a 
proposed bylaw after the CA, Inc. opinion. See Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1–2 
(noting that a proposed bylaw that modifies the reimbursement requirement with the clause 
“consistent with its fiduciary duties” could not be excluded). 
 153. Indeed, even when Office Depot attempted to reject the addition of a shareholder 
bylaw that allowed for reimbursement, the company still acknowledged that the proposal would 
be permissible with a proper fiduciary-out clause. See id. at *5–6 (containing Office Depot’s 
argument that the proposal “does not clearly and unambiguously provide a fiduciary out as 
required by the Delaware Supreme Court”). 
 154. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (discussing the 
likelihood that the board would utilize the fiduciary-out clause to oppose shareholder 
nominees); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text. As further evidence of the reticence 
of boards of directors to accept shareholder-proposed bylaws, one can simply review the 
massive number of no-action letters in which the SEC declines to allow a proposal’s exclusion. 
See, e.g., Syms Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 324 (Apr. 17, 2009); 
Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 608 (Mar. 23, 2009); 
Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145; The Boeing Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 156 (Feb. 18, 2009). 
 155. Short slate candidates are candidates on a slate that covers “less than half of the 
positions to be contested in the election.” McDonnell, supra note 107, at 662. 
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dissident shareholders, but it would also discourage contested 
elections generally by signaling to future dissident shareholders that 
there is no chance of reimbursement for waging a proxy contest 
challenging incumbent directors. 
The first question is whether this problem is likely to occur. Is a 
board of directors likely to oppose the reimbursement of 
expenditures made on behalf of the dissident slate? Comments by 
board members and lobbying groups for business management, such 
as the Business Roundtable, indicate that “boards are congenial and 
unified entities that would be harmed by the expression of contrary 
views”156 and that “boards are likely to oppose the replacement of any 
of their members with ‘outsiders.’”157 This sentiment would 
presumably extend to dissident candidates, whose candidacy directors 
could discourage by refusing to reimburse those who are successful. 
Indeed, evidence of directors’ opposition to any new members and to 
the ability of shareholders to nominate directors can be found in the 
multitude of SEC no-action letters sought by boards in response to 
proposals after the CA, Inc. opinion.158 There is a very real likelihood 
that, given their incentives, incumbent directors would choose not to 
reimburse dissident candidates whenever possible. As one scholar 
noted in response to the CA, Inc. decision, 
[v]irtually all bylaws limit board discretion in some way, and with 
some creativity one should almost always be able to come up with 
circumstances where doing what the bylaw requires would force the 
board to act in a way that violates its duty if it had discretion to act 
as it chose.159 
Thus, quite possibly, the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause could 
undermine the purpose of the proposed Bylaw in the first place.160 
 
 156. Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders’ 
Franchise Right, 44 STAN L. REV. 129, 130 (1991). 
 157. Id. (“Incumbent directors of many corporations think that they know best . . . who 
should comprise the board of directors.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1 (informing Office Depot that the SEC 
would not “express any view regarding the applicability of rule 14a-8” to AFSCME’s proposed 
amendment to the company’s bylaws). 
 159. McDonnell, supra note 107, at 664. 
 160. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (noting the 
“possibility that [the inclusion of a fiduciary out] would enable directors to challenge the 
payment of expenses for every successful candidate, thereby defeating shareholders’ purpose in 
adopting the bylaw”). 
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It is also important to establish that the court’s decision in CA, 
Inc. attributed significant importance to the shareholders’ rights to 
participate in the nomination of director candidates, evident in the 
extent to which the opinion lauded the shareholder franchise and the 
foundational role it plays in corporate law. The court stated: 
[T]he unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate] 
office . . . is meaningless without the right to participate in selecting 
the contestants. As the nominating process circumscribes the range 
of choice to be made, it is a fundamental and outcome-
determinative step in the election of officeholders. To allow for 
voting while maintaining a closed selection process thus renders the 
former an empty exercise.161 
The court noted that this “unadorned right” becomes worthless if the 
shareholders cannot meaningfully participate in the nomination of 
candidates.162 It follows logically, then, that the court should 
discourage actions that limit the ability of shareholders to participate 
in contested director elections, thereby making their right to vote 
meaningless. 
But the court should go one step further. If protecting the 
selection of candidates is fundamental, as the court granted,163 and the 
inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause is necessary to comply with 
Delaware law, as the court implied,164 then the court must use a 
particularly strict standard to review a board’s exercise of discretion 
with respect to the use of that fiduciary-out clause. 
B. Blasius’s Stricter Standard of Scrutiny Is Preferable to More 
Deferential Standards 
As explained, a weaker standard of scrutiny when board actions 
directly impede shareholder actions is improper. Invoking a stricter 
standard of review for director actions is not novel. Delaware courts 
generally apply one of three broad standards of review: a “deferential 
review under the business judgment rule,” an “intermediate scrutiny 
applying a reasonableness analysis,” and the heightened compelling 
 
 161. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) (quoting 
Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. Ch. 2002)). 
 162. See id. (noting that the process is meaningless if it does not allow for shareholder 
participation in the selection of candidates for the board of directors). 
 163. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. See supra Part II.C. 
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justification review of Blasius.165 Scholars have discussed the proper 
standard of review when a board of directors attempts to interfere 
with the shareholders’ role in a proxy contest,166 and some scholars 
have advocated a stricter standard when a board of directors acts in a 
manner that inhibits shareholders from undertaking a proxy contest.167 
When a proposal deals not only with the proxy contest but also with 
the director-election process itself, there is even greater need for a 
stricter standard of review.168 Business judgment deference and even 
some heightened standards of review are not sufficient when 
reviewing director decisions to reject reimbursement. Only the 
Blasius standard of review provides sufficient protections to the 
shareholder franchise by requiring a compelling justification before a 
board of directors can interfere in a shareholder vote or bylaw. 
1. Business Judgment Deference.  In most circumstances, director 
decisions receive business judgment deference.169 Under the business 
deference rule articulated in Kamin v. American Express Co.,170 courts 
refuse to second-guess the decisionmaking of boards when a board is 
carrying out its ordinary business decisions.171 To encourage 
reasonable risk-taking on the part of directors, courts are loathe to 
 
 165. MICHAEL B. TUMAS & MICHAEL K. KELLY, POTTER, ANDERSON, & CORROON LLP, 
RETHINKING THE BLASIUS STANDARD OF REVIEW: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MERCIER V. INTER-
TEL (DELAWARE), INC. 2 (2008), available at http://www.potteranderson.com/assets/ 
attachments/Rethinking_the_Blasius_Standard_of_Reveiw.pdf [sic]. 
 166. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: 
When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 557–60 (1993) (addressing what 
standard of review should be used when incumbent boards attempt to use rights plans to the 
potential detriment of a dissident election campaign); Warren & Abrams, supra note 34, at 652–
63 (discussing the importance of Blasius as it may interact with Unocal and other cases in 
reviewing defensive measures that have the effect of shareholder disenfranchisement). 
 167. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 166, at 559 (arguing that a board’s use of defensive tactics 
should receive stricter review when, in particular, such tactics “interfere[] with a shareholder 
group’s ability to communicate with other shareholders or with other important voting rights, 
such as the right to nominate candidates”). 
 168. For further argument on this point, see infra Part IV.C. 
 169. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding 
that, absent bad faith, stockholders may not question a board of directors’ exercise of its 
discretion when the board is carrying out ordinary business decisions, such as declaring 
dividends); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003) 
(noting that “[t]he business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. 
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))). 
 170. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 171. Id. at 812. 
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interfere with business decisions absent a showing of bad faith.172 The 
business judgment rule underlies a central tenet of Delaware 
corporate law: the need to trust directors generally. Thus, business 
judgment deference is the default standard under which the Delaware 
courts review the decisions of the board of directors in managing the 
company’s affairs.173 This standard makes sense because so much of 
Delaware corporate law is premised on the notion that managers are 
bound by their fiduciary duties to shareholders but otherwise must be 
free to act as they see fit.174 This standard is incredibly lenient and, as 
this Note explains, would be an inappropriately permissive standard 
of review for director actions that interfere with the election process. 
2. Intermediate and Heightened Scrutiny.  Delaware courts have 
determined that, in certain circumstances, business judgment 
deference should not be granted.175 In circumstances in which the 
action of the board of directors involves potential or inherent 
conflicts of interest, like a decision to reject a tender offer that would 
cost the directors their jobs, a higher level of scrutiny is warranted.176 
Thus, the Delaware courts enforce “an enhanced duty which calls for 
judicial examination at the threshold before protections of the 
business judgment rule” apply.177 Courts use this enhanced scrutiny 
because conflicted directors who stand to gain disproportionately 
from their own decision bring with them the “omnipresent specter 
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than 
 
 172. See id. at 812–13 (stating the court’s reluctance to interfere with a board’s management 
absent a showing of dishonesty, lest it deter the appropriate exercise of board discretion). 
 173. For an in-depth discussion of the business judgment rule and a comparison with 
heightened forms of scrutiny in general, see Klein, supra note 156, at 147–57. “The primary 
rationale for the business judgment rule is that courts are ill suited to review and evaluate the 
wisdom of complex business decisions.” Id. at 148. 
 174. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 n.6 (Del. 2008) 
(“One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the 
ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.” (quoting 
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291–92 (Del. 1998)). See generally 
EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 539–41 (discussing the interrelation between the standards of 
conduct and standards of review in corporate law). 
 175. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of 
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has 
the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the 
courts.”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
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those of the corporation and its shareholders.”178 There are three key 
forms of increased scrutiny available to Delaware courts when 
reviewing board actions that appear detrimental to shareholders;179 
these standards of review vary from an intermediate level of scrutiny 
to an extremely heightened scrutiny. The court identified the 
standards in three landmark cases: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 
Co.,180 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,181 and Blasius. These standards of 
review must be distinguished to explain why the Blasius standard is 
appropriate in the context of fiduciary-out clauses. 
Neither the Weinberger nor the Unocal standard is compatible 
with the scenario posed by a board of directors’ abuse of its fiduciary-
out clause. Unocal review requires a board of directors that has 
decided to take defensive measures against a takeover to show that it 
had, with good faith and upon appropriate investigation, a belief that 
the takeover posed a threat to the corporation; the board’s action 
must then be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”182 The 
majority of the Unocal analysis, however, focuses on the threat of a 
takeover,183 an element not present in the shareholder-bylaw proposal 
and director-election contexts. The proposed Bylaw simply attempts 
to institute a process through which successful candidates are 
reimbursed.184 This change would have the effect of increasing the 
likelihood of contested elections, but it would not create a threat that 
should trigger a Unocal analysis.185 Likewise, the typical deal 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Compare Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding 
the board to a burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for actions with the “purpose 
of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”), with Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55 
(explaining that conflicted directors have the burden of showing that their actions were taken in 
good faith with no desire to perpetuate themselves in office and were “reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed”), and Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (requiring a showing of “[t]he concept of 
fairness [with] two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price”). For a detailed discussion of the 
Unocal, Weinberger, and Blasius standards and their varying levels of heightened scrutiny, see 
Klein, supra note 156, at 147–57. 
 180. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 181. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 182. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 183. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (“A Unocal analysis should 
be used only when a board . . . adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.”). 
 184. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230 (Del. 2008). 
 185. Recall that Unocal analysis is triggered by the threat of a takeover and the use of 
defensive measures by the board in response to that threat. See, e.g., Williams, 671 A.2d at 1377 
(noting that a Unocal analysis only applies in the context of a board’s adoption of defensive 
measures against a perceived threat to the corporate enterprise). 
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protections and defensive measures utilized by a board of directors 
would have little effect after an election.186 The Unocal standard is, of 
course, a higher standard than the business judgment rule, but the 
Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that the Blasius standard 
applies more specifically to instances of shareholder 
disenfranchisement.187 
The entire fairness test from Weinberger requires a showing of 
both a fair price in a given transaction and fair dealing or process in 
undertaking that transaction.188 However, the entire fairness standard 
is not relevant to the corporate governance context,189 as there is no 
transaction or price to take into account. Although the entire fairness 
test provides heightened scrutiny, it has rarely been utilized outside 
the takeover context. The situation that this Note addresses would 
take place after a shareholder vote to accept the proposed bylaw and 
after a short slate candidate is successfully voted onto the board. 
Defensive measures at that point would be completely out of place, as 
would a standard of review meant to deal with them. Instead, 
attempts by the incumbent board to undermine the election of an 
individual to the board would be unilateral, unprovoked actions with 
the taint of both entrenchment and shareholder disenfranchisement. 
Such actions would necessitate a Blasius standard of review. 
The Blasius standard places upon the board “the heavy burden 
of demonstrating a compelling justification” for the board action that 
impeded shareholder voting power.190 To invoke Blasius, “[t]he 
franchise interest [of shareholders] should clearly be in jeopardy 
before a court grants it special protection.”191 The board’s action 
 
 186. Typical deal protections, such as no-shop provisions, or defensive measures, such as 
shareholder rights plans for repurchasing shares, simply would have no bearing on the 
reimbursement of a candidate. Such measures—and an analysis of such measures—are more 
appropriate in the context in which a proxy contest is waged simultaneous to a tender offer. For 
further discussion, see Warren & Abrams, supra note 34, at 652–53, discussing the general 
framework as applied in Unocal, and Klein, supra note 156, at 149–50, addressing the Unocal 
court’s standard of review to determine the reasonableness of board action. 
 187. See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376 (“[T]he . . . standard set forth in Blasius is appropriate 
only where the ‘“primary purpose’ of the board’s action [is] to interfere with or impede exercise 
of the shareholder franchise . . . .’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 
A.2d 75, 93 (Del. 1992))); see also id. at 1377 (distinguishing between “either unilateral director 
action in the face of a claimed threat or an act of disenfranchisement” (emphasis omitted)). 
 188. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 189. See Klein, supra note 156, at 148 (noting that in the 1980s, with the market for 
corporate control developing, the entire fairness standard of review became “unsatisfactory”). 
 190. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 191. Klein, supra note 156, at 156. 
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should come close to “foreclosing effective shareholder action.”192 
Chancellor Allen explains his rationale for utilizing a higher degree of 
scrutiny in such instances, stating: 
[T]he ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule 
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder 
voting context. That is, a decision by the board to act for the primary 
purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote 
inevitably involves the question who, as between the principal and 
the agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal 
corporate governance. . . . Action designed principally to interfere 
with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict 
between the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial review of 
such action involves a determination of the legal and equitable 
obligations of an agent towards his principal. This is not . . . a 
question that a court may leave to the agent finally to decide so long 
as he does so honestly and competently; that is, it may not be left to 
the agent’s business judgment.193 
Admittedly, “Blasius’ burden of demonstrating a ‘compelling 
justification’ is quite onerous” and should therefore be “applied 
rarely.”194 Courts have articulated that Blasius’ onerous standard is 
appropriate only when the “‘purpose of the board’s action [is] to 
interfere with or impede exercise of the shareholder franchise,’ and 
the stockholders are not given a ‘full and fair opportunity to vote.’”195 
C. Blasius Review Should Be Used when Directors Discourage 
Contested Elections 
 Delaware courts have noted previously that “[t]he corporate 
election process, if it is to have any validity, must be conducted with 
scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or 
denied to any candidate or slate of candidates.”196 Delaware courts 
require that “those in charge of the election machinery of a 
corporation must be held to the highest standards in providing for 
and conducting corporate elections.”197 A board’s decision to refuse 
 
 192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663. 
 193. Id. at 659–60 (footnotes omitted). 
 194. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996). But see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 
771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[T]he fact that [Blasius] is ‘onerous’ is not a reason not to 
apply it if the circumstances warrant.”). 
 195. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)). 
 196. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 197. Id. at 1206–07. 
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reimbursement would inherently subordinate the dissident slate; it 
would effectively signal the incumbent board’s commitment to 
oppose any attempt to facilitate more competitive and responsive 
director elections. 
As the court in Blasius noted, “[t]he only justification that 
can . . . be offered for [such a board] action is that the board knows 
better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation’s best 
interest.”198 The court continued, however, by arguing that “[w]hile 
that premise is no doubt true for any number of matters, it is 
irrelevant . . . when the question is who should comprise the board.”199 
The Delaware Supreme Court has since adopted this very logic.200 A 
board of directors should not be permitted to assert that it knows 
better than the shareholders—the proper electorate—whom that 
electorate should choose as its directors. Such an assertion, given 
Chancellor Allen’s logic in Blasius,201 should necessarily invoke the 
Blasius compelling justification requirement. Because the Delaware 
Supreme Court defined the right to choose contestants as part of the 
shareholders’ right to vote for directors,202 it follows that an action 
taken to undermine the nomination of future directors has the 
purpose and effect of impeding the exercise of the shareholder 
franchise. When a board impedes the shareholder franchise, Blasius 
review is appropriate. 
The decision by a board to refuse reimbursement to the 
nominating party of a successful dissident candidate is not a typical 
business decision. Instead, it is inherently tied to the election process. 
The Blasius standard is more likely to be applied to decisions outside 
of the ordinary business decisions of the board.203 Thus, a decision that 
has the effect of limiting or preventing a portion of shareholder 
voting likely deserves the protection of the Blasius standard of 
 
 198. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1128–29 (Del. 2003) (quoting in 
multiple places Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Blasius). 
 201. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (“The theory of our corporation law confers power upon 
directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.”). 
 202. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008). 
 203. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics 
of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927, 935 (2001). 
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review; the detrimental effect, though perhaps not imminent, is 
nonetheless guaranteed.204 
When assessing whether a Blasius standard of review is 
appropriate, one must demonstrate that not only the purpose but also 
the effect of the action was to the detriment of the shareholder 
franchise.205 Succinctly put, did the action thwart a shareholder 
vote?206 One may argue that a Blasius standard is inappropriate when, 
as here, the board’s action did not interfere with the vote itself; 
likewise, one could argue that discouraging future elections does not 
amount to discouraging an imminent contest and therefore does not 
trigger Blasius. Indeed, CA argued that the fact that the proposed 
Bylaw dealt with corporate funds and would have its effect after the 
election in essence removed it from the spectrum of shareholder 
enfranchisement, and thus was outside proper shareholder action.207 
Such arguments, however, ignore the fact that the refusal to 
reimburse candidates inherently undermines the vote, thus interfering 
with the voting process going forward.208 
Another potential criticism of the invocation of the Blasius 
standard is that the Unocal standard, or simply a balancing or entire 
fairness test, would be sufficient. In other words, the courts need not 
 
 204. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Absent 
confessions of improper purpose, the most important evidence of what a board intended to do is 
often what effects its actions have.”). 
 205. See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 930 (“When assessing whether the Blasius 
standard applies to an individual case, lawyers are often consumed by the question of the 
defendant’s motive or purpose. They sometimes fail to appreciate that courts make an equally 
important inquiry into whether the defendant’s action, whatever its purpose, had the proscribed 
effect.”). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Broc Romanek, The Delaware Supreme Court’s AFSCME/CA Hearing: All the 
News Fit to Post, THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, July 10, 2008, http://www.thecorporate 
counsel.net/Blog/2008/07/the-delaware-supreme-courts-afscmeca-hearing-all-the-news-fit-to-
post.html (noting CA’s argument that the “Bylaw mandates a payment of expenses, rather than 
relates to an election, and control over corporate expenditures is part of the business and affairs 
of the corporation”). Compare Brief of Appellant at 18, CA, Inc., 953 A.2d 227 (No. 329,2008), 
2008 WL 2724909, at *15 (“It does not matter that the expenditures nominally concern 
stockholder voting, rather than other aspects of a company’s business operations . . . .”), with 
Brief of Appellee at 12–13, CA, Inc., 953 A.2d 227 (No. 329,2008), 2008 WL 2724908, at *10 
(“Because the nomination process is an integral element of the shareholder franchise, the 
Proposed Bylaw addresses an area that is an appropriate subject matter for shareholder 
action.”). 
 208. See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 931 (“Such selective and one-sided use of 
[director] power, if permitted, would fundamentally undermine the process of shareholder 
voting. In addition, a one-sided voting process would surely deter any proxy contestant and 
undermine the institutional integrity of corporate democracy.”). 
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utilize Blasius because its strict standard is unnecessary given Unocal 
and Weinberger. This criticism, however, misses the point of Blasius. 
As one study found, “despite the considerable overlap between the 
Blasius standard and [other standards], the Blasius standard serves a 
purpose not served by [the others].”209 Blasius is the only standard of 
review that recognizes that certain decisions should not qualify as 
business decisions, and that therefore adopts a sufficiently strict 
approach to protecting against threats to the shareholder franchise, 
the bedrock of Delaware corporate law.210 
Likewise, a company could assert that, when the shareholders 
have already successfully voted for a dissident candidate, it is logically 
inconsistent to then argue that the board could interfere with the 
exercise of that vote after the fact. To invoke Blasius, however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has held that “a board need not actually 
prevent the shareholders from attaining any success in seating one or 
more nominees,” nor does the contested election need to “involve a 
challenge for outright control of the board.”211 Moreover, such an 
argument ignores the importance of reimbursement as part of the 
voting process going forward; reimbursement facilitates shareholders’ 
rights to participate in the selection of candidates.212 By discouraging 
future contested elections, the board of directors would inherently 
“impede [the] exercise of the shareholder franchise.”213 The Delaware 
Supreme Court specifically recognized shareholders’ right to choose 
contestants in an election and noted shareholders’ entitlement to 
encourage the candidacy of nonboard-sponsored nominees.214 By 
doing so, the court inherently supported the notion that actions with 
 
 209. Id. at 929; see also id. (assessing the Blasius doctrine’s usefulness). 
 210. See id. at 944 (noting that Blasius applies in circumstances in which Unocal cannot and 
is particularly suited for the conflicts raised by corporate elections). 
 211. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003). 
 212. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237 (noting that the Bylaw facilitates shareholders’ rights to 
participate in director nominations); see also Posting of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, 
supra note 118 (noting that the potential for costly litigation would be a deterrent for those 
considering nominating candidates, ultimately undermining the purpose of the Bylaw). 
 213. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996); see also id. (noting that Blasius is 
invoked when the board’s actions limit the shareholder franchise and shareholders’ ability to 
freely and fully vote). This Note asserts that, by discouraging future candidates from 
campaigning for a board position, the incumbent board interferes with the shareholders’ ability 
to freely and fully vote insofar as the Delaware Supreme Court understands the right to vote to 
include the ability to choose the contestants for that election. For a discussion of the 
meaninglessness of a shareholder’s right to vote without the ability to choose the contestants for 
that election, see supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 214. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
FAWAL IN FINAL READ 3/4/2010  2:12:08 AM 
1496 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1457 
the effect of suppressing shareholders’ efforts to encourage alternate 
candidates would, in effect, thwart the proper exercise of the 
shareholder franchise by undermining a right that the court 
specifically delineated.215 
Another potential criticism of the invocation of the compelling 
justification standard is that strict scrutiny assumes that the board 
acted with the purpose of disenfranchisement.216 One could argue that 
a board that chooses to reject reimbursement does so in good faith 
and with no specific intent to discourage future contested elections. 
But it is important to note that, although the Blasius standard has 
only been applied when a given motive is present, it does not require 
that the directors be acting in bad faith or to the detriment of the 
shareholders.217 Indeed, in Blasius, the good faith belief of the board 
was not enough to cure the improper purpose to interfere with the 
shareholder voting process.218 
Given the directors’ knowledge of the effects of their decision, it 
is fair to assume that, without compelling justification, the board’s 
intent is to discourage dissident candidates.219 Logically, if the 
 
 215. If the Delaware Supreme Court is not willing to prevent actions that discourage 
contested election and director nominations, then the importance the court placed on 
shareholders’ rights to choose contestants in an election is undermined.  It makes little  sense for 
the court to praise the shareholder franchise with respect to candidate nominations while 
simultaneously refusing to defend the right to protect those nominations from attack. 
 216. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that 
compelling justification review is appropriate when the “board acts . . . for the primary purpose 
of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”). 
 217. See id. at 658, 663 (discussing whether a board that acts in good faith may ever validly 
act with the purpose of discouraging the proper functioning of the shareholder voting process 
and finding that when “the action taken [by the board] was taken in good faith, it [still] 
constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to the 
shareholders”). 
 218. Id. at 663. 
 219. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Absent 
confessions of improper purpose, the most important evidence of what a board intended to do is 
often what effects its actions have.”). Asserting director intent in the reimbursement refusal 
context requires an application of common sense. To assume that the board’s purpose is 
shareholder disenfranchisement requires looking at the effect of a board’s decision to refuse 
reimbursement on shareholder enfranchisement generally. In other words, would the refusal to 
reimburse candidates systematically cause shareholders to be less likely to fund dissident 
candidates in a contested board election? Given the logic the Delaware Supreme Court uses to 
hold that the Bylaw in CA, Inc. is a protected element of the shareholder franchise, the 
undermining of such a proposal would necessarily cause disenfranchisement. Common sense 
assumes a disenfranchisement purpose when the board knows its actions would have the 
deleterious effect of discouraging shareholder support for contested elections. See Thomas, 
supra note 166, at 553–54 (discussing the sensibility of courts’ use of common sense to determine 
FAWAL IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:12:08 AM 
2010] PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER ACCESS 1497 
shareholders know that a board will wield its fiduciary-out clause 
liberally, the promise of reimbursement is certain to be illusory. And 
when the effect of a board’s action is clear and relatively certain, the 
board will have “the impossible task of convincing the court that this 
effect of the [action] was not intended.”220 Courts, of course, are 
permitted to look past the purported “business” rationale when the 
clear effect of an action is to interfere with the election process.221 
Thus, Blasius would be appropriate except in the case in which a 
compelling justification makes it less likely that the board desired to 
discourage future dissident candidate nominations. 
On the other hand, a court will not invoke Blasius scrutiny when 
shareholders have had a full and fair opportunity to vote and 
ultimately ratify the board’s action.222 In such an instance, Blasius 
would be inappropriate because the shareholder franchise was 
exercised. This would be quite distinct from the proposed 
hypothetical in which the shareholders’ only vote was for a candidate 
who the board then unilaterally chose not to reimburse. 
A final potential criticism is that the application of the Blasius 
standard would eliminate the effect of the fiduciary-out clause 
altogether. One could assert that any protection that a fiduciary-out 
clause affords to shareholders would be necessarily eliminated by 
holding the clause to an artificially high standard of review. This 
argument misses the point, however; Chancellor Allen purposefully 
avoided articulating a per se rule of invalidity in Blasius even when 
the board acted for entrenchment or shareholder 
disenfranchisement.223 Instead, Blasius review requires a compelling 
justification—a high standard, to be sure, but one that enables the 
board to explain its purpose and intended effect.224 If a board of 
directors chose not to reimburse a candidate who ran for personal 
 
whether defensive tactics taken by a board have a severe impact on the dissident candidates in a 
contested election). 
 220. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 937. 
 221. See id. at 937–38 (noting instances in which the court has looked past the purported 
rationale of a poison pill or change-of-control provision when its clear effect was to deter future 
proxy contests). 
 222. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992) (“[Defendant’s] shareholders, 
unlike those in both Blasius and Aprahamian, had a full and fair opportunity to vote on the 
Amendments and did so. The result of the vote, ceding greater authority to the board, does not 
under the circumstances implicate Unocal or Blasius.”). 
 223. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662. 
 224. See id. (explaining the court’s rationale for not choosing a per se rule). 
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reasons, the compelling justification would be demonstrated.225 Thus, 
applying the Blasius standard to the exercise of a fiduciary-out clause 
to prevent reimbursement would not have a drastically limiting effect 
on directors’ legitimate discretion. Moreover, any argument invoking 
the protection of shareholders as a justification is inherently 
weakened by the fact that, in the context of reimbursing a successful 
candidate, a majority of shareholders has voted for the dissident 
candidate.226 To allow fiduciary outs without applying a strict standard 
of review would, in effect, seriously hamper the ability of that 
majority to cry foul after the election.227 Thus, to preserve shareholder 
access to director elections, Delaware courts must utilize the Blasius 
standard of review.228 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the CA, Inc. decision, the Delaware General 
Assembly approved rule changes to incorporate the new role for 
shareholders in the nomination process of director candidates. These 
amendments to the DGCL, signed into law by Governor Jack 
Markell on April 10, 2009, signal a greater role for shareholder 
activists229 and codify  the CA, Inc. decision, ensuring its lasting impact 
 
 225. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 n.34 (Del. 2008) 
(explaining one situation that would likely suffice as a compelling justification for the board to 
refuse reimbursement to protect against shareholders reimbursing a candidate who ran based on 
purely personal motivations). But see Posting of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 
118 (asserting that it is unlikely that a candidate with purely personal motivations could 
successfully attain a board position unless he could add value to the company). 
 226. For a discussion of the impropriety of using a fiduciary-out clause as a limitation on the 
expressly voiced desires of shareholders, see supra Part III.B and note 144. 
 227. See 1 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 146, § 18:26.20 (“A fiduciary-out clause grants the 
board broad authority, but presumably permits the proponents an avenue to challenge whether 
the board breached its fiduciary duties. This is not much of an avenue . . . .”). 
 228. It is important to note, before concluding, that the arguments contained herein are 
applicable specifically in the context of shareholder proposals and attempts by a board of 
directors to limit the reimbursement of a successful short slate candidate. Most fiduciary-out 
clauses serve to protect shareholders and thus do not risk the same abuses that a fiduciary out in 
the CA, Inc. context would raise. When fiduciary-out clauses serve to protect shareholder 
interests more directly, as in Omnicare, the same basis for implementing a Blasius standard of 
review is not present. In no way should these arguments be taken to support the concept that 
compelling justification review should be applied to invocations of a fiduciary-out clause to 
protect against board action rather than shareholder action. 
 229. Sheri Qualters, Changes in Delaware Corporate Law Expected to Aid Activists Change 
Bylaws, Elect Directors, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2009, at 7 (noting that the reimbursement provisions 
added to Delaware corporate law after the CA, Inc. decision “are expected to aid shareholder 
activists seeking bylaw changes, that boost their ability to nominate and elect directors”); see 
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on the contours of Delaware corporate law. Likewise, the SEC felt 
compelled to alter its rules after CA, Inc., proposing a rule change 
that would incorporate the holding of CA, Inc. and allow 
shareholders to propose bylaws that reimburse successful dissident 
candidates.230 Thus, in the wake of CA, Inc. and the ensuing rule 
changes it prompted, shareholders will likely avail themselves of their 
newfound powers during the spring 2010 proxy season.231 These rule 
changes indicate the importance of the CA, Inc. decision,232 but the 
likely uptick in shareholder-proposed bylaws should also illustrate the 
need for an appropriate standard of review. It is likely that with this 
increase the SEC will see an influx of requests for no-action letters. 
And although the Commission might tell complaining companies not 
to exclude shareholder proposals for candidate reimbursement, the 
SEC has no power to control the exercise of discretion that directors 
have over fiduciary-out clauses. Instead, Delaware courts must play 
the role of arbiter. 
Delaware courts, then, will be faced again with the difficult 
question of just how much discretion the board of directors ought to 
have in determining whether a particular election contest is in the 
best interest of the company and its shareholders. The Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. signaled its desire for strong 
protections of shareholders’ rights to participate meaningfully in 
director elections.233 Underscoring that protection, it follows that any 
contested election that is not based on purely personal motivations 
benefits the shareholders because it provides them with greater 
choice and a voice in determining who manages their company. To 
protect the rights of shareholders to participate in the selection of 
 
also ROPES & GRAY LLP, AMENDMENTS TO DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW MAY 
AID ACTIVIST STOCKHOLDERS (2009), http://www.ropesgray.com/delawaregeneralcorporation 
lawmayaidactiviststockholders/ (describing the provisions of the amendments). 
 230. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9046 & 
34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 
240, 249, 274). 
 231. Qualters, supra note 229 (predicting that the spring 2010 proxy season will see a 
dramatic increase in shareholder-proposed bylaws). 
 232. In the aftermath of CA, Inc., some companies have recognized the inevitability of 
shareholder participation in the nomination process and have embraced the reimbursement of 
proxy expenses. See Joann S. Lublin, Fair Fight? Assistance Is Offered in Proxies, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 26, 2009, at B1 (noting that “HealthSouth Corp. is moving to become the first big U.S. 
business to reimburse activist shareholders for the expense of unseating management-backed 
directors”). 
 233. See supra Part II.B. 
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director candidates,234 the Delaware Supreme Court must use 
heightened scrutiny to review any directorial claim that 
reimbursement violates the board’s fiduciary duties. Specifically, the 
compelling justification standard of review, articulated in Blasius, is 
necessary given the very high risk that a board would act to entrench 
itself and deter future candidates’ challenges. 
Corporate governance reforms need not be accomplished solely 
via legislative action. By ensuring that directors are accountable to 
shareholders, courts can give deference to directors’ managerial 
determinations without allowing directors to control the outcomes of 
their own elections. Ultimately, boards of directors should answer for 
their choices of executives and their allocation of compensation. The 
public sentiment clearly favors a greater say for shareholders in the 
decisions made in corporate boardrooms. But that sentiment calls for 
a new structure for corporate management in which the shareholders 
help manage the company. Rather than legislate such an upheaval, 
shareholder participation can be facilitated within the current 
structure. Instead of enacting compensation legislation, for example, 
a standard of review that protects shareholder participation can help 
shareholders realize the influence they can have on this issue. By 
assuring that shareholders have a meaningful ability to participate in 
the election of directors, courts can better uphold the fundamental 
principles of corporate law without uprooting the established 
structure. 
 
 234. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) 
(explaining the court’s rationale for the need for great protection of any embodiment of the 
shareholder franchise). 
